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I. The problem of unauthorised dispositions 
 
What should our commercial law do about the problem of unauthorised transfers of 
chattels? More formally, if someone grants you a proprietary interest in a thing, how far 
should your interest be affected by the fact that the grantor neither owned the thing nor 
was authorised by the owner to dispose of it?  
 The question is a chestnut, but none the worse for a new look. For one thing, a lot 
of what has been said about it in England is either platitudinous 1 or aimed at a specific 
problem arising out of unauthorised dispositions rather than the issue as a whole 2. For 
another, even though this is an area where civil lawyers think very differently, surprisingly 
little is said about how far their experience might inform our own 3. Thirdly, even though the 
present system can be politely described as an incoherent mess, there has been only one 
reform in the last fifty years – namely, the unlamented disappearance in 1995 of market 
overt 4, a comparatively small change precipitated not by reforming zeal or academic 
pressure, but by an adventitious scandal in the art world 5. And lastly, the point matters. 
Even though an increasing proportion of this field is covered by specific regimes – on the 
ranking of security interests, on priorities in insolvency, or for that matter the background 
rules on equitable and legal interests – we still need logical and defensible background 
principles against which these special rules can operate.  
 Hence the present article. It aims to look at the subject in the round, where 
necessary drawing from how things are done elsewhere. To keep it within bounds, it has a 
few limitations. It will not cover specific self-contained systems, for example those 
                                            
1 Typical is Denning L.J.’s sonorous but ultimately vacuous statement in Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corp 
Ltd v Transport Brakes Ltd [1949] 1 K.B. 322, 366 (“In the development of our law, two principles have 
striven for mastery. The first is for the  protection of property: no one can give a better title than he 
himself possesses. The second is for the protection of commercial transactions: the person who takes in 
good faith and for value without notice should get a good title. The first principle has held sway for a long 
time, but it has been modified by the common law itself and by statute so as to meet the needs of our 
own times”).  
2 A representative sample: A.Diamond, “Law Reform Committee: Twelfth Report on the Transfer of Title to 
Chattels” (1966) 29 M.L.R. 418; D.Greig, “The Passing of Property and the Misidentified Buyer” (1972) 
35 M.L.R. 306; J.Ulph, “Sale and Lease-Back Agreements in a World of Title Relativity: Michael Gerson 
(Leasing) Ltd v Wilkinson and State Securities Ltd” (2001) 64 M.L.R. 481; L.van de Vliet, Note (2001) 5 
Edin. L.Rev. 361; C.Hare, “Identity Mistakes: A Missed Opportunity?” (2004) 67 M.L.R. 993; D.Miller, 
“Plausible rogues: contract and property” (2005) 9 Edin. L.Rev. 150; L.Merrett, “The Importance of 
Delivery and Possession in the Passing of Title” [2008] C.L.J. 376. 
3 For commendable exceptions see S.Thomas, “Mistaken Identity: A Comparative Analysis” [2008] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 188 and D.Miller, “Plausible rogues: contract and property” (2005) 9 Edin. L.Rev. 150 (though 
both these are essentially limited to the specific problem of goods obtained by fraud). A perceptive earlier 
example is C.Harding & M.Rowell, “Protection of Property Versus Protection of Commercial Transactions 
in French and English Law” (1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 354.  
4 By the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994, repealing s.22(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. For a 
useful description of the old law, with all its curiosities and anomalies (for example, its inapplicability to 
ordinary shops except in the City of London), see Crossley Vaines on Personal Property (5th ed, 1973), 
174-175. 
5 In summary, in early 1993 a person presented for valuation at Sotheby's a Gainsborough and a 
Reynolds, both previously stolen from Lincoln's Inn and later bought by him in Bermondsey Market for a 
princely £145. He was accepted to have impeccable title under the then rule of market overt (see The 
Independent, Saturday March 6, 1993). The art community was outraged; pressure was brought; market 
overt was duly suppressed.  
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applicable to company charges or registered ships (though it will discuss how such 
schemes should be accommodated in any general regime); nor will it cover complexities 
over unauthorised dispositions of part of a bulk 6. Coverage will be angled towards non-
consumer cases, that is to cases where owner and ultimate transferee are businesses. 
This is because, even though the present law rarely in fact treats consumers differently 7, 
the need to provide special protection to entirely private parties may well raise separate 
difficulties. So too, discussion will be limited to wrongful dispositions: cases where a 
possessor is authorised by law to override an owner’s title, such as execution sales or 
disposals of seized goods 8, do not raise the same issues and will be be ignored. 
 These matters aside, however, it will aim at as much generality as possible. To 
anticipate briefly, it will make the case for enacting a general principle of entrustment – 
broadly, a rule that anyone voluntarily entrusting possession of goods to another ought to 
take the risk of subsequent malversation – and then to go on to work out the implications 
of such a rule (which are less straightforward than one might think). For ease of reference, 
it will use three stock characters: O, a chattel owner (or sometimes holder of some lesser 
interest); P, an intermediary possessor of the chattel purporting to convey a proprietary 
interest in it; and R, the supposed recipient of that interest. Admittedly this is an over-
simplification, since the chattel may well pass through the hands of two or more parties 
between leaving O’s hands and arriving in R’s (an important point, on which more below). 
But we will employ this scheme as a general template.  
  
 
II. The present position – a summary. 
 
To begin with, a short summary 9 of the present English position and attempts to reform it 
may be helpful.  
 The starting point is that R gets no better right than P had: nemo plus iuris 
transferre ad alium potest quam ipse habet 10. This is so at common law 11, as regards not 
only ownership but all proprietary interests 12; in one limited case it is preserved by statute 
in the form of s.21 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 13. Hence if R wishes to prevail over O it  
must invoke a specific exception. Of these there are about half-a-dozen, depending on 
how you count them.  
                                            
6 Some of the issues here were helpfully covered in I.Davies, “Continuing dilemmas with passing of 
property in part of a bulk” [1991] J.B.L. 111. 
7 Section 27 of the Hire Purchase Act 1964, allowing anyone other than a motor dealer to get good title to 
a hire-purchased vehicle, gets close. But even there the distinction is not exact: any business buyer other 
than a motor dealer is equally protected. 
8 See, for example, the decision in Bulbruin Ltd v Romanyszyn [1994] R.T.R. 273 (abandoned stolen van 
recovered and sold off by local authority under statutory powers: original owner’s rights held overridden 
by sale). 
9 For full coverage see Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), Chapter 7. 
10 Said to come from Ulpian: D. 50.17.54. 
11 E.g. Whistler v Forster (1863) 14 CBNS 248, 257 (Willes J); Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459, 
463-464 (Lord Cairns); Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 LR App Cas 426, 435-436; Cole v NW Bank 
(1874-75) LR 10 CP 354, 362-363 (Lord Blackburn); Farquharson Bros & Co v King & Co [1902] A.C. 
325, 335-336 (Lord MacNaghten).   
12 For example pledge (Paterson v Tash (1742) 2 Str. 1178; Hartop v Hoare (1743) 1 Wils KB 8), or lien 
(Buxton v Baughan (1834) 6 C & P 674). It equally applies where O himself has a proprietary interest 
less than ownership: e.g. Reeves v Capper (1838) 5 Bing NC 136 (competition between pledgees). 
13 Namely, where P purports to sell outright to R. It follows that in so far as provisions in the 1979 Act 
protect non-buyers such as pledgees (for example ss.24 and 25) they are strictly speaking exceptions 
not to s.21 but to the common law rules.  
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 First, O may be estopped from asserting its right against R 14 if it expressly or 
impliedly represents to R 15 that P owns the goods 16 or that it has authorised P to dispose 
of them 17. Common-law in origin 18, though statutorily acknowledged 19, this principle can 
in principle validate any kind of disposition 20.  
 Secondly, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 deals with the repercussions of the rule 
allowing a buyer to become owner without delivery, or conversely take delivery without yet 
being owner 21. Under ss.24 22 and 25(1) 23 the seller in the first case, and the buyer in the 
second, can pass title to a second good-faith buyer R, provided the latter takes delivery 
from P 24. R must be a buyer, pledgee or someone in an analogous position 25; in other 
cases R, however faultless, remains unprotected 26. 
 Thirdly, in very limited circumstances R is protected against a subsequent claim by 
O on the basis of a simple entrustment by O to P. This arises under s.2 of the Factors Act 
1889, extending a narrower common-law protection derived from the agency doctrine of 
ostensible authority 27. P must have been in the business of dealing in goods of that sort; 
O must have entrusted them to P for sale or pledge 28; and P must have passed (though 
not necessarily delivered) them to R in the ordinary course of business.   
 Fourthly, good faith acquisition is partially protected where P defrauds O of goods 
which it then transfers for value to a good faith receiver R. Essentially, R’s right becomes 
                                            
14 And any third party taking from R: Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 2 Q.B. 242, 270 (Pearson 
LJ) and Big Rock Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Ltd (1992) 10 WAR 259, 270-271. 
15 There must be a positive misleading of R. A mere transfer to P of possession or the trappings of 
ownership will not do: Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd v Unity Finance Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 371, 388, 393 
(Hodson and Morris L.JJ), and a fortiori neither will mere fault by O (Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v 
Twitchings [1977] A.C. 890.  
16 E.g. Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 469; more recently, Chatfields-Martin Walter Ltd v Lombard North 
Central Plc [2014 EWHC 1222 (QB). 
17 E.g. Eastern Distributors Ltd v Goldring [1957] 2 Q.B. 600. 
18 E.g. Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 469. 
19 By s.21 above “ … unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s 
authority to sell”.  
20 See e.g. the Singapore decision in Pan-Electric Industries Ltd v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd 
[1994] 1 S.L.R. 185 (equitable mortgage). 
21 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.17. 
22 Dating from the Factors Act (Amendment) Act 1877, s.3, in the case of sellers in possession of 
documents of title, and otherwise from 1889 (Factors Act 1889, s.8) (which is still in force and essentially 
duplicates it). 
23 Originally s.4 of the 1877 Act, above, in the case of buyers armed with documents of title; otherwise 
dating from, and duplicated by, the Factors Act 1889, s.9. 
24 Including the case where R obtains the goods directly from O with P’s acquiescence: see Four Point 
Garage Ltd v Carter [1985] 3 All E.R. 12 and the earlier Langmead v Thyer Rubber Co Ltd [1947] 
S.A.S.R. 29. 
25 Since in both cases the reference is to “any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof”. As to what “other 
disposition” means, see Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), paras.7-064, 7-79 – 7-80; for an example of a 
“disposition” other than a sale or pledge, see Shenstone & Co v Hilton [1894] 2 Q.B. 452 (handing over 
to an agent for onsale). 
26 For example, a mortgage or charge, held in Joblin v Watkins & Roseveare (Motors) Ltd [1949] 1 All E.R. 
47 (a case under s.2 of the Factors Act 1889, which uses the same words) not to be an “other 
disposition”. 
27 Pickering v Busk (1812) 15 East 38. This however applied only to sales and not to pledges: Paterson v 
Tash (1742) 2 Strange 1179. It was extended to them progressively by legislation, starting in 1823 and 
culminating in the 1889 Act. See S.Thomas, “The Origins of the Factors Acts 1823 and 1825”, 32 J. Legal 
Hist. 151 (2011); also G.Gilmore, “The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman”, 15 Ga L.Rev. 605, 608 et seq (1981). 
28 An entrustment for some other purpose such as repair or hiring-out is not enough, even though R has no 
means of knowing anything about these circumstances: Astley Industrial Trust Ltd v Miller [1968] 2 All 
E.R. 36. 
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indefeasible if two requirements are satisfied: namely, that P obtained a voidable title from 
O 29, normally under a sale contract voidable for fraud 30, and that there has been no 
effective avoidance of P's title before the disposition to R. This was always the rule at 
common law 31; when the transaction between P and R is one of outright sale, it is 
statutory 32. 
 Fifthly, there are miscellaneous other cases of protection, one of the best-known 
being that afforded by statute to buyers, other than motor dealers, of vehicles let on hire-
purchase 33. 
 Lastly, all the above exceptions exist against the background of other regimes, 
which serve to complicate the picture further. First, the rules of equity always hover in the 
background, shielding good faith purchasers against equitable interests 34 – a matter of 
some significance in the case of non-possessory security interests short of ownership, 
because such interests are nearly all equitable 35 and there has since 2013 been no 
requirement for non-UK companies to register them, even when they affect property in 
England 36. Secondly, there are a number of regimes on priorities existing more or less 
independently of the general law: for instance the rules in Part 25 of the Companies Act 
2006 on charges created by UK companies, Schedule 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1995 on dealings with registered ships, and the Cape Town Convention regime for 
interests in aircraft 37. Further, it should not be forgotten that insolvency law special rules 
apply to protect good faith purchasers where property is disposed of by an insolvent 
whose power of disposition has otherwise been curtailed 38. 
 
III. Reform efforts. 
 
Such a ramshackle structure might be expected to spur reform. It has not: the only 
exception is certain proposals primarily connected with security law which might have had 
incidental effects on unauthorised dispositions as a whole 39. In 1966 the now-defunct Law 
                                            
29 See Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), Para.7-023 for discussion of the issue of the cases where P’s title is 
voidable and where it is wholly void.  
30 According to Kingsford v Merry (1856) 1 H & N 503, voidable title can only arise under a sale from O to P. 
But this seems doubtful. Cf Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); [2005] Ch. 281 at [126] (Rimer J) 
(concerning a voidable transfer of money to a fraudster). 
31 The earliest example seems to be Parker v Patrick (1793) 5 T.R. 175. See too White v Garden (1851) 10 
CB 919; Babcock v Lawson (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 284. This remains important where R’s interest is less than 
ownership, such as a pledge (Babcock v Lawson, above), or an equitable security (Attenborough v 
London & St. Katharine's Dock Co (1878) 3 C.P.D. 450). 
32 See s.23 of the 1979 Act. 
33 Hire Purchase Act 1964, s.27. 
34 This is not a mere theoretical possibility: for a thoroughly commercial example see MCC Proceeds Inc v 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675 (pledge of bearer securities held on bare 
trust). 
35 The only legal security interest, a mortgage of chattels, is hardly used. 
36 See the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013, 2013 SI 600, introducing the 
present Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006. 
37 See the International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town Convention) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/ 
912. 
38 For example, Insolvency Act 1986, s.284(4)(a). Note also the analogous protection in insolvency law for 
good faith transferees for value in cases of transactions impugnable as unfair preferences or transfers at 
an undervalue (s.241(2)(a)). 
39 Notably in the shape of the Crowther Report of 1971 on Consumer Credit ((1971) Cmnd 4596); the 1982 
Cork Report on Insolvency Law and Practice ((1982) Cmnd 8558); the 1989 Diamond Report (A Review 
of Security Interests in Property); the Law Commission’s Report on Company Security Interests in 2005 
(2005 Cm 6654); and most recently another report from the Law Commission on bills of sale (Law Com 
Report No 369). There is also an ongoing Secured Transactions Law Reform Project administered from 
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Reform Committee suggested minor changes 40, inspired mainly by a clutch of cases 
where fraudsters had sold cars to innocent dupes for cash 41. These would have tinkered 
with the rules on buyers in possession, extended the voidable title rule to cover almost all 
cases of fraud, and extended the then rule of market overt to cover all goods bought in 
retail premises or at public auction. Nothing happened. In 1989 the Diamond Report 42, a 
document largely concerned with security interests, suggested in passing  that anyone 
entrusted with goods under a contract of sale, lease or hire-purchase might be empowered 
to pass title to an innocent buyer. Again nothing happened. Five years later, the 
Department of Trade and Industry tentatively floated a proposal under which in essence 
any innocent purchaser from a person in possession of goods with the owner's consent 
would get good title 43. Unfortunately this suggestion, which would hardly have raised an 
eyebrow on the other side of the English Channel 44, was very superficially supported and 
inadequately argued. It was intemperately attacked 45, and quickly forgotten. In 2005 the 
Law Commission expressed an intention to investigate the whole subject of nemo dat in 
non-theft cases 46, but by 2011 admitted that it had lost interest 47. Meanwhile, the only 
reform that did take place was the one mentioned at the beginning of this article, namely 
the abolition of market overt. 
  
 
IV. The present law: an appraisal 
 
In the light of all this, it is difficult to regard the present English position as anything other 
than an arbitrary and unpredictable mess There is no overall plan for deciding when a 
good faith receiver ought or ought not to be protected. Furthermore, the protections 
provided to third-party acquirers are spectacularly capricious. For example, a receiver R 
can frequently sleep easy if it buys goods in P’s possession, less so if it lends against 
them, and hardly at all if it takes those same goods on hire, uses them, or asserts a lien 
over them 48. Again, a financier providing a van under a finance lease can repossess it if 
the lessee dishonestly sells it; but if it lets the same vehicle out on hire-purchase or 
conditional sale it loses out unless the buyer is a motor dealer 49. In fraud cases the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oxford University: see https://securedtransactionslawreformproject.org.  
40 See its Twelfth Report: Transfer of Title to Chattels, 1966 Cmnd 2958: see A.Diamond, “Law Reform 
Committee: Twelfth Report on the Transfer of Title to Chattels” (1966) 29 M.L.R. 418 and (more sour) 
P.Atiyah, “Law Reform Committee: Twelfth Report” (1966) 29 M.L.R. 541. 
41 Notably Ingram v Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 Q.B. 560, and Car 
& Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525.  
42 A Review of Security Interests in Property (HMSO, 1989). The author, Aubrey Diamond, was at various 
times a solicitor, Law Commissioner and law professor at the University of London. At the time the report 
appeared he was retired. 
43 Consultation Document, Transfer of Title: Sections 21 to 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (January 20, 
1994). 
44 Provisions in a number of civil law jurisdictions are mentioned below in Part V.A. 
45 E.g. B.Davenport, “Consultation - how not to do it” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 165 and D.Miller, “Transfer of Title: 
A New Legal Regime in Only Three Paragraphs”  [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 322. Interestingly, almost no stir at 
all had resulted from a similar proposal by the Scottish Law Commission nearly twenty years earlier, in 
1976 (see Memorandum 27 - Corporeal Moveables - Protection of the Onerous bona fide Acquirer of 
Another's Property, Para.28). 
46 As part of its ninth programme of law reform: see Law Com No 293, paras.3.51 – 3.57 (March 2005). 
This was partly spurred by the decision in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62; [2004] 1 A.C. 
919. 
47 Law Com No 330, paras.3.4 – 3.6 (July 2011). 
48 This is because of the limitation already referred to in ss.24 and 25 of the 1979 Act, and s.2 of the 
Factors Act 1889, restricting protection to sales, pledges and other dispositions. 
49 Hire Purchase Act 1964, s.27. To make confusion yet worse confounded, the financier can get the 
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distinction between a voidable title in P, which can benefit R provided itv takes in good 
faith, and a void title, which cannot, is at best hard to draw and at worst incomprehensible 
50.  
 Again, there is no unified concept of a good faith receiver, with the result that the 
hurdles to be cleared by R in order to receive protection vary curiously according to the 
nemo dat exception in question. If buying from a seller or buyer in possession R must not 
only be in good faith but take delivery; if from a mercantile agent or voidable title-holder, a 
paper transaction is enough 51 (though in the latter case the sale must be in the ordinary 
course of business 52). Yet again, the burden of proof is apt to swing like a weathercock. 
When sued by O, if R relies on a voidable title in P it can sit back and tell O to establish its 
case 53; to profit from any other exception to nemo dat it must it seems plead and prove it 
54.  
 Indeed, the strongest indication that the status quo is unsatisfactory is that, while 
many writers have described it, few if any have seriously tried to support it. Furthermore, 
such efforts have been fairly consistently unconvincing. For instance, the objection raised 
against the Department of Trade’s 1994 proposal essentially comprised a plea that any 
substantial downgrading of existing property rights must be bad; that it would be 
unthinkable if the depositee of a car or a ring was empowered unilaterally to expropriate 
the owner by selling it; and that the proposal was an open invitation to fraud 55. Of these, 
the first begs the question; the second is highly controversial (assuming nothing to chose 
between O and R in terms of fault, it is perfectly arguable that O, as the person choosing 
whether and where to entrust goods, should take the risk of subsequent malversation); 
and the third is simply unsupported (indeed, it presumably entails a belief that most of 
Europe, where person in possession with the owner’s consent can generally pass title, 
must compared with England be a hotbed of dishonesty). 
 
 
V. The way ahead 
 
A: An entrusting rule 
 
If English commercial law is to reflect live up to its reputation of being as straightforward 
                                                                                                                                                 
vehicle back if it was transferred in payment of a pre-existing debt, since this does not count as a sale: 
VFS Financial Services Ltd v JF Plant Tyres Ltd [2013] EWHC 346 (QB); [2013] 1 W.L.R. 2987. 
50 As illustrated by the majority and minority judgments in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62; 
[2004] 1 A.C. 919. Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, 2015), Paras.3-036 – 3-048, takes eight closely-printed 
pages to say that the law is unsatisfactory and uncertain. For further criticism see C.Macmillan, “Rogues, 
swindlers and cheats: the development of mistake of identity in English contract law” [2005] C.L.J. 711; 
also Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62; [2004] 1 A.C. 919 at [5] (Lord Nicholls), [57]-[71] 
(Lord Millett). A perceptive comparison of the English and US (UCC, Art.2-403(1)) approaches comes in 
S.Thomas, “Mistaken Identity: A Comparative Analysis” [2008] L.M.C.L.Q. 188. 
51 Indeed, in the case of voidable title it seems that the sale from O to P may equally be a mere paper 
transaction: Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), para.7-027. 
52 Expressly so (“sale, pledge, or other disposition ... made by him when acting in the ordinary course of 
business ...”). To complicate matters even further, the same seems to apply by a side-wind to buyers in 
possession, because under s.25 of the 1979 Act the sale “has the same effect as if the person making 
the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods”. See Newtons of Wembley 
Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 Q.B. 560, 580 (Pearson LJ) and Martin v Duffy [1985]  N.I. 417. 
53 See Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 K. B. 463 (upheld by the Court of Appeal in the unreported 
decision in Thomas v Heelas, CA, November 27, 1985).  
54 Heap v Motorists' Advisory Agency Ltd [1923] 1 K.B. 577. 
55 See the arguments in D.Miller, “Transfer Of Title: A New Legal Regime In Only Three Paragraphs” [1994] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 322, 324 and B.Davenport, “Consultation - how not to do it” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 165. 
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and uncomplicated as possible, we clearly need to put matters on a rational footing. What 
will be suggested in this section is the introduction of a general “entrusting rule”.  
 Crudely summarised, this means that in so far as R can prove that it received 
chattels in good faith from a possessor P, and that O did not lose possession against its 
will, R should succeed as against O. This should, however, be subject to three conditions. 
First, R must have believed when it received the goods that P either owned them, or 
otherwise had authority to deal with them. Secondly, R must not have had knowledge of 
matters indicating to a reasonable person in its position that P did not have the power of 
disposition. Thirdly, R must have given value (subject to one qualification, referred to 
below).  
 In addition, it will be suggested that any scheme should have four further features. 
First, it should not be limited to ownership proper but should cover all proprietary interests, 
whether it is a question of O losing them or R gaining them. Secondly, it should be capable 
of defeating the interests of third parties other than O, provided that those entitled were not 
themselves dispossessed without their consent. Thirdly, it should (subject to a few 
exceptions) supplement existing exceptions to nemo dat. And fourthly, it should 
acknowledge that it existed against a background of specific schemes and ideally allow the 




B. Why an entrusting rule? 
 
Why choose an entrusting rule? It is suggested that it can be justified on four bases.  
 
(1) The point of principle 
 
The main argument advanced here is as follows. Any discussion of nemo dat is at bottom 
a discussion of how to balance the interests of an original owner O with those of a good 
faith acquirer R once P is out of the picture. There are, of course, any number of ways of 
doing this (some of which will be mentioned below). But the entrusting rule, or something 
like it, is it is suggested the only one that, in reaching the balance, gives adequate weight 
to the essential nature of ownership 56 itself.  
 According to one’s point of view, one can regard ownership as an institution resting 
on a number of possible justifications: for example, autonomy 57, efficiency 58, or the 
practical needs of commerce 59. But whichever view one takes, it is suggested that two 
features stand out as distinguishing characteristics, without which an institution would not 
be ownership as we know it. One is the idea that ownership exists as the irremovable 
residual or background right to dictate how a thing is to be used or exploited, which 
continues to subsist whatever other lesser rights may come and go 60. The other is a 
                                            
56 We talk of ownership for brevity: but most of what we say applies to proprietary interests as a whole. 
57 E.g. C.Reich, “The New Property” 73 Yale L.J. 733, 773 (1963); A.Dorfman, “Private Ownership” (2010) 
16 L.Th. 1, 17. 
58 E.g. H.Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights”, 57 Am.Ec.Rev.Papers 347 (1967); F.Michelman, 
“Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law”, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); more recently, J.Huffman, “The Public Interest in private Property Rights”, 50 
Okla. L. Rev. 377 (1997). 
59 An obvious point is that one can hardly make sense of trading goods without a background concept of 
ownership. But there are others: for example, insolvency law presupposes a distinction between interests 
in chattels that do, and do not, prevail in insolvency: Goode on Proprietary Rights in Insolvency (3rd ed), 
3-5. 
60 An idea that seems to originate with W.W.Buckland: see W.Buckland & A.McNair, Roman Law and 
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degree of permanence. Interests in assets can be difficult to characterise convincingly as 
ownership if they are precarious or readily defeasible without any action on the part of the 
person entitled 61.  
 These two features, suggestive as they are of relatively permanent interests 
existing in the background whether or not consciously exercised, suggest (it is submitted) 
that if we are to pay proper respect to the institution of ownership in deciding nemo dat 
conflicts, we need a system that makes ownership rights presumptively indefeasible, 
unless and until the owner chooses to do something consistent with consent to being 
divested 62. And this is precisely the essence of an entrusting rule. A principle of this kind 
respects these features of ownership by insisting that before O can be expropriated there 
must be an affirmative act on its part consistent, at least outwardly 63, with an intent to 
alienate it 64. Conversely, it refuses to deprive O of ownership where the property was 
taken without such a consent, this being inconsistent with the status that ought to be 
accorded accorded to property rights 65. 
 Of course an entrusting rule is not the only possible approach. A large number of 
other possible criteria have been suggested for deciding who ought to win a contest of 
priorities between owner and acquirer: for instance relative fault 66, some more general 
form of equitable apportionment 67, allocative efficiency of scarce goods 68, relative need 
69, or some sophisticated combination of these 70.  
 Such approaches nevertheless all face one common difficulty: namely, that unlike 
                                                                                                                                                 
Common Law (2nd ed), 65-66. 
61 Examples: the right to a quantity of goods from a given source whose content is subject to change (Re 
Stapylton Fletcher Ltd [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1181), or to take percolating water under one’s land (Bradford 
Corp v Pickles [1895] A.C. 587, esp at 593-594 (Lord Halsbury). Both are clearly legal rights in respect of 
things: both fall short of ownership. See generally on permanence and ownership T.Merrill & H.Smith, 
“What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?”, 111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001); and on precariousness 
and property K.Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] C.L.J. 252, 266 et seq. 
62 Compare J.Penner, “The Bundle of Rights Theory of property”, 43 UCLA L.Rev. 711, 742. 
63 Admittedly, we are not requiring actual intent here. But this seems also to be the rule for direct transfers 
of ownership; although there are few cases directly in point, this view seems implicit in decisions such as 
Mercantile Credit Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 2 Q.B. 242 and, for that matter, in the land case of Saunders v 
Anglia Building Society [1971] A.C. 1039. 
64 Compare Note, “The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A Critique of Section 2-403 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code”, 72 Yale L. J. 1205, 1209 (1963) (commenting on a semi-entrustment rule in 
UCC, Art.2-403(2)). Or, to quote a pithy French commentator, “Morality is secured. All the more so 
because the owner who is caught by [the entrusting rule] has always consented to being dispossessed; 
where this is not so (the case of theft or loss), the law protects him.” See P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les 
Biens (6th ed), s.576 [author’s translation]. 
65 This view, interestingly, is sometimes expressed as a defence of the entrustment principle in France: see 
C.Harding & M.Rowell, “Protection of Property Versus Protection of Commercial Transactions in French 
and English Law” (1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 354, 358-363. 
66 A.Schwartz & R.Scott, “Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase”, 111 Col L.Rev. 1332 (2011); also 
D.Phillips, “The Commercial Culpability Scale”, 92 Yale L.J. 228. Cf H.Burgess, “The Market Overt Rule: 
a Time for Reform?” (2015) 53 Ir.Jur. 154. 
67 See in particular Ingram v Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, 73-74 (Devlin LJ) (“The plain answer is that the loss 
should be divided between them in such proportion as is just in all the circumstances. If it be pure 
misfortune, the loss should be borne equally; if the fault or imprudence of either party has caused or 
contributed to the loss, it should be borne by that party in the whole or in the greater part”). This is 
different from fault because of the proposal to split losses equally where no-one is to blame. 
68 E.g. H.Weinberg, “Sales law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods”, 9 J.Leg.St. 969; M. Mautner, 
“’The Eternal Triangles of the Law’: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties” 
(1991) 90 Mich L Rev 95, 99. 
69 E.g. M.Radin, “Property and Personhood”, 34 Stanford L.Rev. 957 (1982). 
70 M. Mautner, “’The Eternal Triangles of the Law’: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving 
Remote Parties” (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 95. 
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the entrustment principle they treat title conflicts similarly to other issues, such as contract 
or accident law, and as a result fail to give sufficient weight to the special nature of 
ownership 71. But they raise other problems too. Notably, the adoption of any approach 
based on the actual situation of the parties and applied on a case-by-case basis makes 
the law more unpredictable and the task of settling title disputes quickly and efficiently 
correspondingly harder. Determining entitlement (or dividing loss) according to fault, for 
instance, potentially turns every property dispute into a complex evidential dispute about 
relative blame. Furthermore, it raises formidable problems with repeated dispositions and 
multiple parties. Imagine O entrusts a thing to P; P sells it to R1, which on-sells to R2. 
Whose fault would be relevant, and in what proportions, to determine R2’s rights against 
O: R1's, R2's, or both? 72 To be fair, it has been suggested that we can overcome such 
complaints by applying fault criteria on a “typical situations” basis: that is, by grouping 
cases into typical situations, determining the rule to be applied to each, and then applying 
it without reference to the facts of the actual dispute 73. But this raises its own further 
difficulties. Identifying typical situations is not straightforward (how widely or narrowly 
should they be drawn?). Furthermore, any move in this direction is effectively regarding 
the chosen criterion not so much as a test, as merely a guide to be taken into account. It is 
no doubt for reasons such as this, that criteria such as relative fault have (it is suggested 
rightly) never attracted much following, either in England 74 or for that matter in any major 
common or civil law jurisdiction. 
 
 
(2) The relation between entrusting and the present law 
 
Apart from the argument of principle, it is suggested that an entrusting rule would not only 
simplify matters, but do so with a welcome lack of drastic change. This is because the 
existing position under English law is already nearer to an entrusting rule than one might 
believe 75. This point may seem surprising, but a moment’s thought will confirm it. Of the 
specific exceptions to nemo dat described in Part II above, three explicitly depend on 
voluntary entrustment. Sections 24 and 25 of the 1979 Act both demand that the seller or 
buyer, as the case may be, should be or remain in possession with the consent of the 
owner; and the same goes for the factor’s possession in s.2 of the Factors Act 1889. 
                                            
71 See e.g. T.Merrill & H.Smith, “What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?”, 111 Yale L.J. 357. 
Some writers cheerfully admit their devaluation of ownership: see, for example, D.Keating, “Examining 
UCC Title Battles through a Torts Lens” 2011 Utah L. Rev. 255, and the comment in M. Mautner, “’The 
Eternal Triangles of the Law’: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties” (1991) 
90 Mich L Rev 95, 102 that title conflicts have a great deal in common with accidents. 
72 This, among others, was the reason for the summary rejection of the idea by the Law Reform Committee 
in its Twelfth Report (Note Error! Bookmark not defined. above). See too D.Keating, “Examining UCC 
Title Battles through a Torts Lens” 2011 Utah L. Rev. 255, 270. 
73 M. Mautner, “’The Eternal Triangles of the Law’: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving 
Remote Parties” (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 95, 107. The same approach is evident in  D.Phillips, “The 
Commercial Culpability Scale”, 92 Yale L.J. 228, 232 (1983). Throughout the latter article the emphasis is 
on a broad estimation of who typically is likely to be at fault, rather than on anything more precise. 
74 The 1966 Twelfth Report on the Transfer of Title to Chattels, 1966 Cmnd 2958, fairly summarily rejected 
apportionment as unworkable: Paras.8-13. In this connection see too Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), para.7-
008, observing that we can now forget Ashurst J’s antique apophthegm in Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 
T.R. 63, 70 that “wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has 
enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it”.  
75 Compare Lord Nicholls’ comments in his dissenting opinion in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] 
UKHL 62; [2004] 1 A.C. 919 at [35] (burdening the “person who takes the risks inherent in parting with his 
goods” is “the direction in which, under the more recent decisions, the law has now been moving for 
some time”). 
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Equally two more exceptions, s.23 on voidable title and s.27 of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 
dealing with vehicles on hire purchase, largely assume it: one cannot readily have a 
voidable title or a hire-purchase arrangement without an underlying entrustment of 
possession. Turning to the more general law, it is also worth remembering that other rules 
incidentally raising issues of unauthorised disposition, such as those on equitable title, 
unregistered charges and insolvency, are also concerned overwhelmingly with situations 
where O, the entity entitled, acquiesces in a middleman P possessing the property later 
alienated to R. 
 The point also works in the converse way. Hardly any of the current exceptions 
work where O has been deprived of possession against its will: indeed, the one that 
regularly had this effect, market overt, has been abolished. It is true that estoppel remains 
capable of protecting the third party in cases of theft 76: but in practice virtually all estoppel 
cases also turn on entrustment. 
 In effect, therefore, it is suggested that the effect of introducing a general 
entrustment rule should be seen as embodying not so much a change in the present law, 
as a confirmation of the existing pattern inherent in it by the removal of a number of 
exceptions. In large part, moreover, these are exceptions that are hard to justify. Few 
would seriously support, for example, the Helby v Matthews 77 rule excluding hire-
purchase transactions from the protection given to R in respect of goods sold under 
reservation of title because they contain a technical option in the hirer not to buy 78, or the 
bar on mercantile agents passing title to R if (unknown to R) they were entrusted with 
goods for some purpose other than sale or pledge 79.  
  
 
(3) The partial parallel with the UCC.  
 
We have so far not mentioned American developments. Until the coming of the UCC, most 
American states essentially applied the English system of a number of discrete exceptions 
to nemo dat 80. Art.2 of the UCC, however, has now greatly widened the third party’s 
protection. Art.2-403 in particular extends the ability of an entrustee to transfer goods in 
two vital ways: by saying that P obtains a voidable title in almost every case of fraudulent 
purchase 81, and even more importantly by saying that any entrustment of goods to a 
dealer in those goods allows the latter validly to transfer them to a good faith receiver 82. 
This solution goes a good deal of the way towards a general entrustment rule, though 
admittedly not the whole way: thus it does not allow non-dealers to pass title on the basis 
                                            
76 Debs v Sibec Developments Ltd [1990] R.T.R. 91 would have been such a case had the representation 
not been made under duress. 
77 [1895] A.C. 471.  
78 A point made by the Court of Appeal in Helby v Matthews: see [1894] 2 Q.B. 262. It is true that today 
there may be other reasons connected with tax or accounting for choosing lease-purchase over sale as a 
financing tool; but this is no reason to alter the protection given to third parties.  
79 Even though the point was apparently regarded by Chapman J in Astley Industrial Trust Ltd v Miller 
[1968] 2 All E.R. 36, 40 as self-proving.  
80 The Uniform law Commissioners’ Uniform Sales Act of 1906, ss.23-25, for example, reproduced virtually 
word-for-word what are now ss.21, 23 and 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979; and most States had some 
equivalent of the Factors Act 1889 to deal with mercantile agents and buyers in possession. For a brief 
history see G.Gilmore, “The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase”, 63 Yale L J 1057, 1057-1063 
(1954) and G.Gilmore, “The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions 
of a Repentant Draftsman”, 15 Ga L.Rev. 605. Note also K.Jillson, “UCC §2-403: A Reform in Need of a 
Reform” 20 Wm & Mary L.Rev. 513 (1979). 
81 See Art.2-403(1).  
82 See Art.2-403(2). The whole subject is admirably summarised in J.White & R.Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code (6th ed), 200-207. 
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of entrustment 83, and affects only the interests of the immediate entruster O (thus leaving 
other entrusters’ interests to trip up unwary buyers 84). Furthermore, it is largely based on 
the same ideas: namely, that in at least certain circumstances a voluntary entrusting ought 
to serve to justify expropriating O 85. It is also worth adding that, although this article is not 
specifically concerned with the specialist topic of security interests, Article 9 of the UCC 
also goes some way towards protecting a buyer in the ordinary course of business against 
pre-existing security interests, even if the latter are otherwise perfected and thus on 
principle effective against third parties 86.  
 
 
(4) The European dimension 
 
If the UCC in the American context has gone a large way towards adopting a de facto 
theory of entrustment, European civil lawyers have gone the whole course. By and large 
the theory of entrustment is now regarded as entirely orthodox 87, so that when faced with 
unauthorised dispositions of the kind dealt with in this article civil law regimes subordinate 
O’s rights to R as a matter of course in any case where O was not dispossessed without its 
consent. These systems are worth a look, not only because they may provide inspiration 
for reform here but also since (as will appear below) they may point up problems that 
might go unnoticed in an entirely common-law treatment. 
 The most carefully-modulated system in this respect is German law. The civil code 
explicitly sets the scene, providing that anyone receiving a chattel in good faith from a 
person he believes to be the owner gets good title, free of all prior interests, save where he 
is grossly negligent or the original owner was the victim of loss, theft or some other form of 
involuntary dispossession 88. Furthermore, where P is a businessperson it suffices that R 
merely believed P to have authority to dispose of it even if he did not believe P to be the 
owner 89. The codal principle, moreover, protects not only buyers but to those taking 
pledges or claiming a number of lesser interests in goods 90. Switzerland is very similar in 
approach 91; indeed, in one respect its civil code is even more generous to third party 
acquirers than Germany’s 92.  
 France is more impressionistic. It admittedly has no provision explicitly applying an 
entrusting principle. It has nevertheless reached much the same result through inventive 
interpretation of the famous provision “en fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre” 93, a 
provision originally aimed at something rather different but increasingly pressed into 
                                            
83 In this respect it has been criticised as anomalous: see Note, “The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability of 
Chattels: A Critique of Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 72 Yale L. J. 1205 (1963). 
84 See J.White & R.Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (6th ed), 205. 
85 S.Thomas, “Mistaken Identity: A Comparative Analysis” [2008] L.M.C.L.Q. 188, 204 et seq. 
86 See in particular Art.9-320. This indeed protects such a buyer even if it does know of the general 
existence of a security interest created by the seller. 
87 A useful summary of the civil law situation appears in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
Vol 1, 15. See C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), VIII-3:101. 
88 The rule is contained in BGB, § 932 (nicely summarised in Prütting / Wegen / Weinreich, Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch: BGB (11th ed), § 932); the exception in § 935. 
89 HGB, § 366: see the summary in Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (3rd ed), § 366, Nr 22-23. 
90 See BGB, § 1244 (pledgees) and HGB,  § 366.3 (assorted lienholders). 
91 See ZGB, § 714.2 (good faith acquisition); § 934 (exclusion of cases of theft or dispossession). As in 
Germany, protection is extended beyond ownership to other interests: see ZGB, §§ 746.2, 884, and 895. 
92 Because it extends to all cases where R believes in P's power of disposal, even where P is not a 
businessperson. See ZGB, § 933. 
93 Code Civil, Art.2276 (Art.2279 before 2008). 
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service as a protection for buyers 94. The main difference be between France and 
Germany is that protection is less widely extended beyond good faith buyers, and that a 
lack of good faith in R is more readily found: but these are details. 
 The support provided by commentators in civilian jurisdictions is moreover similar to 
that advanced at the beginning of this section. That is, they argue that if we need to draw a 
line between protection of property and worry-free trade between honest merchants, 
consent by O to dispossession is the least unconvincing place to draw it, since then there 
is at least some conscious consent by O to events that might lead to its dispossession 95.  
Although, as already touched on, the details vary 96, the general principle seems to work 
fairly well. It is noteworthy that it was adopted without serious question by the drafters of 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference 97 as a blueprint for a future European law of 




V. Working out the entrusting rule: when should R be protected? 
  
It is one thing to advocate an entrusting rule; quite another matter, and in practice rather 
more important, to work out in more detail what form it should take. That is the aim of the 




The first vital requirement for an entrusting rule, as mentioned above, is that O should 
have consented to put P in possession. Normally this will be simply a matter of fact: was P 
placed in de facto control of the goods and did O consent to lose that control?  
 As for consent, it is suggested that there is no need to define this in detail 100, and 
that in practice the concept would be generously interpreted it would be unlikely to cause 
difficulties,. Thus existing statutory provisions in England explicitly requiring P to be in 
possession with O’s consent are already construed widely, as looking to immediate 
consent only and virtually ignoring complicating factors such as deceit or trickery 101; this 
                                            
94 For a description of how this happened, see generally F.Terré & P.Simler, Les Biens (8th ed), ss.425-427; 
P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les Biens (6th ed), s.576. 
95 As one contemporary German work puts it, summing up summing up extensive earlier scholarship, it is a 
matter of the danger of malversation that is obvious to anyone who voluntarily surrenders possession of 
a thing: F.Baur & R.Stürmer, Sachenrecht (18th ed), s.52, Nr 8-9. Or, to quote a pithy French 
commentator, “Morality is secured. All the more so because the owner who is caught by [the entrusting 
rule] has always consented to being dispossessed; where this is not so (the case of theft or loss), the law 
protects him.” See P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les Biens (6th ed), s.576. 
96 For the variations see generally U.Drobnig, “Transfer of Property” in A.Hartkamp (ed), Towards a 
European Civil Code (3rd ed), 741. 
97 See C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), VIII-3:101. 
98 See C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), pp 4153-4155 and 4162. 
99 See, in connection with English law in this respect, L.Merrett, “The importance of delivery and 
possession in the passing of title” [2008] C.L.J. 376. 
100 Indeed, there is every reason not to define it: compare the problems that have arisen over the instances 
given in UCC, Art.2-403(1)(a)-(d), described in G.Gilmore, “The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman”, 15 Ga L.Rev. 605, 617 et seq 
(1981). 
101 E.g. Folkes v King [1923] 1 K.B. 282, esp at 296, 305; Du Jardin v Beadman Bros [1952] 2 Q.B. 712 (on 
mercantile agents); Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 Q.B. 560 (buyer in possession). See 
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also reflects practice in many civil law jurisdictions 102, and would no doubt continue.  
Nevertheless, a number of points could do with clarification. 
 First, what must be placed in P’s possession? Apart from the goods themselves, it is 
submitted that symbols of them, for example a key or swipe-card 103 giving access to a 
warehouse or container, should clearly also suffice. This not only fits neatly with the 
treatment of possession elsewhere in English law 104, but also reflects the fact that means 
of access of this kind are regularly used to transfer goods especially where physical 
transfer would be impracticable. The same also goes for possession where there is 
evidence of attornment on the part of a third party 105. 
 What about documents, whether traditional documents of title such as bills of lading 
or others which cannot be used to transfer possession? The answer is that if forms of 
possession such as attornment or symbolic possession through a swipe-card are admitted, 
a fortiori the same must go for documents: if an owner O entrusts them to P, rather than 
having them taken out of its hands, R should be in no worse position than it would have 
been in respect of the goods. This solution has the advantage of maintaining continuity 
with many of the existing exceptions to nemo dat in England, where dealings with 
documents of title are treated as dealings with the goods themselves 106.; it would also in 
practice largely approximate the situation in England to that under Art.7 of the UCC in the 
US, which deals specifically with documents of title – though the latter is, to say the least, 




The good faith of R 
 
The second issue is much more important: to defeat O, R should have to be in good faith 
and without notice of P’s lack of power to deal with the goods. On principle this goes 
without saying: but on the detail some important issues arise. 
 One, already touched on in connection with German law, concerns the precise 
belief to be required of R. Should R have to show that it believed P actually owned the 
goods? Or ought it to suffice that R thought that P had the authority from the owner to 
make the transfer, even if R knew the goods were, or might be, owned by someone else? 
The point looks narrow, but it may matter. For example, it is quite plausible that O may sell 
to P on retention of title terms; that P, not having paid O, sells to R; that R knows this fact, 
but believes that P is authorised to sell on the goods even before payment (possibly on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
too Ingram v Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, 70 (Devlin LJ). 
102 Germany is typical: here, consent is expressed negatively as an absence of previous theft, loss or similar 
dispossession (“wenn die Sache dem Eigentümer gestohlen worden, verloren gegangen oder sonst 
abhanden gekommen war” – BGB, § 935). There has been held to be no such fatal dispossession in 
cases of fraud or trickery, or even duress other than direct violence: see Prütting / Wegen / Weinreich, 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB (11th ed), § 935, Rz 5. 
103 Or possibly a copy of a PIN, if obviously extended to be exclusive. The point can matter, since PINs are 
often used to give access to goods: see e.g. Trafigura Beheer BV v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA 
[2007] EWHC 944 (Comm); [2007] 1 C.L.C. 594 
104 For example, in pledge: see the venerable cases of Hilton v Tucker (1888) 39 Ch.D. 669 and Wrightson v 
Macarthur [1921] 2 K.B. 807. 
105 Compare City Fur Manufacturing Co Ltd v Fureenbond (Brokers) London Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 799. 
106 Expressly so in ss.24 and 25 of the Sale of Goods Act and s.2 of the Factors Act, all of which refer to 
goods or documents of title; but there is no reason why an owner should not equally be estopped from 
asserting its rights in respect of a documentary transfer. See generally S.Thomas, “Transfers of 
documents of title under English law and the Uniform Commercial Code” [2012] LMCLQ 574. 
107 For an excellent and detailed coverage, see  S.Thomas, “Transfers of documents of title under English 
law and the Uniform Commercial Code” [2012] LMCLQ 574, 585-603. 
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basis that it assigns any right to payment to O). If a belief in ownership is necessary, R 
loses: if a belief in authority suffices, it wins 108. This is not something English lawyers 
readily discuss, and under the present law the answer seems to vary 109. Civil law 
jurisdictions also reach different answers; but at least in commercial cases most accept 
that a belief in P’s authority is enough 110. It is submitted that this latter solution is the 
better one. If we regard a voluntary surrender of possession as justifying imposing on O 
the risk of subsequent misdealing by P, there is no reason to complicate the matter by 
imposing an artificial requirement that R’s good faith relate to the ownership of, rather than 
the empowerment to deal with, the thing concerned 111.  
 Another crucial, issue concerns what degree of knowledge (or fault) should disable 
R from relying on the entrusting rule. No-one could seriously argue that R should win if it 
actually knew of P’s lack of authority, or suspected it and chose to turn a blind eye to an 
inconvenient possibility. But what of the more difficult case where R, even if not knowingly 
dishonest, was to some extent at fault: whether by failing to appreciate facts obvious to a 
reasonable person, missing a more or less obvious inference from facts known to it, or 
failing to make proper enquiries (all of which are subtly different)?  
 Under the present English law of nemo dat, this remains unsettled, save that there 
is no doubt that at least some conduct short of positive dishonesty will do. So much is 
clear because several statutory provisions 112 demand both good faith (which by legislative 
fiat means honesty and no more 113) and a lack of notice of P’s lack of authority to deal, 
which presumably means something different. But what counts as notice for these 
purposes remains spectacularly unclear. One can cite suggestions that the doctrine of 
constructive notice (i.e. liability for anything short of actual knowledge of facts) should be 
driven out of commercial law 114; that constructive notice is potentially relevant, at least in 
some cases 115; that the existence of an unusual background to a sale itself constitutes 
                                            
108 A point stressed in Germany: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (3rd ed), § 366, Nr 49. 
109 Under ss.24 and 25 of the 1979 Act, the buyer is defeated if it has notice of the previous sale (s.24) or of 
“any lien or other right of the original seller” (s.25): from which it seems to follow that R is unprotected if it 
knows of such rights but believes that P still has authority to sell the goods (which it might well have in 
cases of sale under retention of title). By contrast, under the Factors Act, s.2, R is defeated only by notice 
“that the person making the disposition has not authority to make the same”, suggesting the opposite 
answer. It also seems clear that estoppel may go to authority as much as ownership. 
110 Germany and Austria limit protection of this kind to goods bought from business sellers, otherwise 
requiring a belief in ownership: see respectively HGB, § 366 and ABGB, § 367. Switzerland seems be 
wider and always to accept as sufficient a belief in the right of P to act on behalf of O: see ZGB, § 933 
and Basler Kommentar zum Zivilgesetzbuch (5th ed), § 933, Rn 29. The DCFR also adopts this solution, 
having discussed the matter: see C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), p 4158. 
111 There is a further point: in German law, where the distinction between belief in ownership and belief in 
authority has to be drawn in non-commercial cases, the drawing of it has been found to be, to say the 
least, difficult. See F.Baur & R.Stürmer, Sachenrecht (18th ed), s.52, Nr 29-30. 
112 See s.23 (“in good faith and without notice of the seller's defect of title”); ss.24, 25 (“in good faith and 
without notice ...”); also Factors Act 1889, s.2 (“provided that the person taking under the disposition acts 
in good faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice that the person making the disposition has 
not authority to make the same”).  
113 See s.61(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
114 Notably Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Co Ltd [1972] 1 Q.B. 210, 218 (Lord 
Denning MR, dealing with notice under what is now s.24 of the Sale of Goods Act) and Feuer Leather 
Corp v Frank Johnston & Sons Ltd [1981] Lexis Citation 837 (Neill J): see too Benjamin on Sale, 9th ed, 
7-047 ((“”notice” of a fact prima facie means actual knowledge of that fact”). More general dicta not in the 
specific context of ownership of goods include Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 Q.B. 539, 545 
(Lindley LJ); Polly Peck International plc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769, 782 (Vinelott J). See too  
Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), Para.7-047, n 313. 
115 See Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No. 3) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 978, 1000–1001 (Millett 
J); Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2010] EWHC 1614 (Ch) at [88] (Lewison 
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notice 116; that notice is actual knowledge of facts yielding a reasonable inference that a 
disposition is unauthorised, even if that inference remains undrawn 117; that there is no 
positive duty in a buyer to investigate underlying facts 118; or that it all depends on what 
sleuth-work is usual in the circumstances 119. 
 For once, civil law practice is not much help either. In France the requirement of 
good faith 120 has been held fairly consistently to bar the buyer’s claim to protection where 
the sale was in circumstances suggestive of skullduggery 121. In Germany gross 
negligence explicitly excludes protection: a point on which there is a great deal of detailed 
law, not always consistent 122. The DCFR adopts a strict standard under which anything 
other than slight negligence bars R 123. 
 In short, we need a clean slate. It is suggested that the best approach is as follows. 
First, there should be no general duty in R to enquire as to P's position. Businesspeople 
do not generally owe a duty of care to safeguard the integrity of others’ property rights 124, 
and to demand that any purchase of goods be accompanied by due diligence would 
disproportionately increase delay and cost with no guarantee of comparable gain. Indeed, 
there is much to be said for resisting any introduction of such a duty even where enquiry is 
usual practice: although failure to make enquiries might be evidence of knowledge, it 
would (it is suggested) be going too far to make the protection of innocent third parties 
strictly dependent on their acting in the ordinary course of business. On the other hand, it 
is suggested that, in line with developments in the law generally 125, knowledge of facts 
should defeat protection if those facts would indicate to a reasonable receiver that 
something was wrong. To this extent, it is suggested that the law ought to continue to 
demand both honesty in fact and, separately, lack of notice in this sense. 
 This leaves a third issue: the burden of proof. Under the present English law it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
J); [2011] 1 B.C.L.C. 202; [2011] W.T.L.R. 839 Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 4136 (Comm);  [2014] 2 All 
E.R. (Comm) 359 at [132]-[136] (Cooke J). Note that in one case of nemo dat constructive notice is 
statutorily excluded: see the Hire Purchase Act 1964, s.29(3), dealing with the non-dealer purchaser of a 
hire-purchased car. 
116 Heap v Motorists Advisory Agency Ltd [1923] 1 K.B. 577. 
117 “A person may have knowledge of a fact either by direct communication, or by being aware of 
circumstances which must lead a reasonable man, applying his mind to them, and judging from them, to 
the conclusion that the fact is so” – Lord Tenterden in Evans v Trueman (1830) 1 Moo & Rob 10, 11 
(under a predecessor of the Factors Act 1889). See too The Saetta [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1334, 1349-1350 
(Clarke J); Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 4136 (Comm);  [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 359 at [132], another 
Factors Act case (“it is appropriate that the court should apply an objective test to determine whether, in 
the circumstances of the sale, the buyer as a reasonable man, must have known of the agent's want of 
authority (or defect in title) or must have had suspicions and wilfully shut his eyes to the means of 
knowledge available to him. It is a question of fact and degree.”).  
118 The Saetta [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1334, 1349-1350 (Clarke J), following the non-sale case of Feuer Leather 
Corporation v Frank Johnstone & Sons [1981] Com.L.R. 251, 253 (Neill J); Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 
4136 (Comm);  [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 359 at [136] 
119 Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 4136 (Comm); [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 359 at [135]-[136]. 
120 Which does not appear at all in the relevant provision (Code Civil, Art.2276), but unsurprisingly is 
accepted to be implicit in it:  F.Terré & P.Simler, Les Biens (8th ed), ss.436. 
121 See P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les Biens (6th ed), s.579 (“The fact that the acquisition happened in 
suspicious circumstances its of itself enough to exclude [good faith]”) and the citations to be found there.  
122 In part because fairly venial fault has often been equiparated to gross negligence. The position is 
summarised, with copious references, in F.Baur & R.Stürmer, Sachenrecht (18th ed), s.52, Nr 26. 
123 C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR), p 4159. 
124 See cases such as Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] A.C. 890 (car dealer owes no duty to 
register hire-purchase transaction with HPI so as to save dealer-buyer from being defrauded). 
125 See cases at Note 117 above, and also e.g. Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 at 195–196 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (notice of equitable right) and Bank of Credit & Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437, 449-457 (Nourse LJ). 
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generally on the receiver R 126 (subject to one anomalous exception 127). This seems right: 
the vital right of an owner to follow its property into whoever's hands it may come should 
not be taken away by presumption 128, from which it is arguable that the initial burden 
should be on the recipient to prove that it has taken honestly. On the other hand, it is 
suggested that if honesty is shown by R, it should then be up to O to show that some other 
bar applies, such as that O was involuntarily dispossessed or that R had knowledge of 
some fact indicating irregularity: any other result would be in effect an unfair demand on R 
to prove a wide-ranging negative. 
 
  
C. Direct and indirect entrusting 
 
A hidden problem in the English treatment of unauthorised dispositions is that discussion 
generally takes the easy way out and assumes that only three parties are involved: O 
dealing with P, and P with R. This assumption, which spills over into legislation 129, can 
cause problems where, as may well happen, the chain is longer. Imagine, for instance, that 
P is a buyer in possession from O; P sells to X, who takes in bad faith; R then buys in good 
faith from X. Any effect of s.25(1) of the 1979 Act is exhausted by the sale to X: it follows 
that R loses out, despite being a buyer in good faith in competition with a seller who quite 
voluntarily delivered the goods before ownership had passed 130. This limitation also has 
the converse result that the receiver R's interests trump only those of O and no-one else. If 
a third party Y itself entrusted the goods to O, its interests remain unaffected. This latter 
point matters commercially. It means, for instance, that if Y sells to O and O to P, both 
sales being on reservation of title terms with no payment made 131, an innocent buyer R 
who pays cash to P takes free of O's interest but not Y's 132. And so too where shipping 
                                            
126 See Heap v Motorists' Advisory Agency Ltd [1923] 1 K.B. 577, 589 (Lush J); Stadium Finance Ltd v 
Robbins [1962] 2 QB 664, 673 (Willmer LJ); Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560, 574-6 
(Sellers LJ); also The Saetta [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1334, 1349-1350 (following two non-sale cases, Baker 
(G.L.) Ltd v Medway Building & Supplies Ltd [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1216 , 1220 and Feuer Leather Corporation 
v. Frank Johnstone & Sons [1981] Com.L.R. 251, 253). 
127 With sale under a voidable title, it seems it is up to the original owner to prove bad faith in the receiver: 
see Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 K. B. 463 (, upheld by the Court of Appeal in the unreported 
decision in Thomas v Heelas, CA, November 27, 1985, but distinguished in Heap v Motorists' Advisory 
Agency Ltd [1923] 1 K.B. 577, a case under the Factors Act, s.2, and regarded with scepticism by 
Benjamin on Sale (8th ed), Para.7-029).   
128 Even though both France and Germany take a different view: see P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les Biens (6th 
ed), s.579 and F.Baur & R.Stürmer, Sachenrecht (18th ed), s.52, Nr 25. 
129 Notably on buyers and sellers in possession and mercantile agents. See Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.24: 
“Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of the goods ... the delivery or transfer 
by that person ... of the goods ... to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of the 
previous sale, has the same effect as if ...”. (Italics supplied). Section 25 and s.2 of the Factors Act 1889 
are similarly worded on the basis that it is the buyer in possession or mercantile agent originally 
entrusted, and no-one else, who makes the wrongful disposition. 
130 This is essentially what happened in Car & Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525, 
where the fraudster who had obtained the car by deception sold to another rogue, who in turn sold to an 
innocent buyer. For a statement that this was the reason why what is now s.25(1) did not apply, see the 
first instance decision at [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1028, 1033. If the sale had been direct to the innocent 
purchaser the section would have applied:  Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 Q.B. 560. 
131 So P does not get title under s.25(1): Re Highway Foods International Ltd (In Administrative 
Receivership) [1995] B.C.C. 271. This result itself ought to be open to question in a logical scheme of 
things: see Part V.F below. 
132 This implicit in the decision in National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association v Jones [1990] 
1 A.C. 24, 63 (Lord Goff). In that case Y was the victim of blatant theft and thus deserving of protection 
anyway: but the House of Lords were explicit that s.25 of the 1979 Act only affected the rights of the 
person immediately selling to the buyer in possession, leaving others' rights intact even though they 
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documents are returned by a bank Y to an importer O under a trust receipt 133, delivered 
but not transferred to a buyer P and sold by P to R. In this case too, and for the same 
reason, R can defeat O's rights but not Y's.  
 These results are unacceptable. In so far as a credulous owner O deserves to bear 
the risk of misdealing when pitted against a good faith buyer R, it should not matter how 
many possessors intervene or who precisely was guilty of misappropriation: all that should 
matter is that the owner is not deemed worthy of protection and the buyer is. Put 
conversely, a person in the position of R should be guaranteed, not simply protection from 
P’s immediate predecessor but clear title, subject only to the exclusion of loss or theft 134. It 
is therefore submitted that any entrusting rule should protect the good faith receiver R in all 
cases, the only exception being where the original owner O was dispossessed against its 
will. This, it is worth noting, is the result in France 135 and in Germany 136.   
 
 
D. A need for delivery? 
 
For an entrusting rule to apply, there is no doubt that O must lose possession to P, since 
otherwise there can be no entrustment at all. But should it be equally necessary that R 
gain it 137? The present English approach is ambivalent. To succeed under ss.24 and 25 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (sellers and buyers in possession) R must take delivery: 
elsewhere, by contrast – estoppel, the Factors Act and voidable title – it need not.  
 The difference is difficult to justify, and it is suggested that the latter is the better 
solution. It is difficult to see why the presence or absence of delivery should make any 
difference to the equities as between O and R 138, assuming the transaction between P 
and R is capable even without it of creating a proprietary interest in the latter 139. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
might have voluntarily surrendered possession. This is precisely what happened in Elwin v O'Regan 
[1971] N.Z.L.R. 1124: see Beattie J at 1131 and R.Ahdar, “The Buyer in Possession Exception Revisited” 
(1989) 4 Canterbury L.Rev. 149, 150.  
133 Which, curiously, has been held to constitute O a mercantile agent for Y under s.2 of the Factors Act, 
thus allowing R to prevail: see Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association 
[1938] 2 K.B. 147. 
134 As it is put in German, R is entitled to receive lastenfreier Erwerb (unencumbered title), a point 
emphasised by BGB, § 936 (“If the thing is encumbered by a third-party right, that right gives way when 
ownership is received [by the good faith recipient]”). 
135 Where Art.2276(1) of the Code Civil, which in saying “in the matter of moveables, possession is as good 
as title”, is referring simply to the good faith possession of the recipient. The exclusion of goods lost or 
stolen appears later, at Art.2276(2). 
136 Hence the structure of German law: providing first that “[T]the person receiving a thing becomes the 
owner of it even where it does not belong to the transferor, unless he was not in good faith …. “, it then 
goes on to disapply this provision “if the thing was stolen from, or lost by, the owner, or otherwise taken 
from his possession. . . .”. See BGB, §§ 932, 935. The point that R is entitled to receive lastenfreier 
Erwerb (unencumbered title) is further emphasised by BGB, § 936 (“If the thing is encumbered by a third-
party right, that right gives way when ownership is received [by the good faith recipient]”). 
137 As it must in many civil law systems. In France the whole basis of R’s rights is the phrase en fait de 
meubles, possession vaut titre (Code Civil, Art.2276), which obviously pre-empts the issue. In Germany 
the result is the same, but one suspects by accident and not design: the reason is that under BGB § 929 
ownership cannot on principle be transferred without delivery, even by someone who is the owner of a 
thing. 
138 The DCFR disagrees, saying that “in cases where [P] stays in possession of the goods after their transfer 
to [R] ... [R] must normally be suspicious” (see C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), p 4156). With respect, it is 
hard to see the basis for this. 
139 Which it is with sales, but not necessarily elsewhere. A pledge, for example, cannot be created without a 
transfer of possession (Inglis v Robertson [1898] A.C. 616). Where this is the case, obviously the issue is  
pre-empted. 
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whole doctrine of entrusting depends on possession by P, and on the impression of 
entitlement created by O in letting P have possession. But why should anyone care 
whether R takes possession? What matters is reliance by R, for example by paying 
money: delivery is beside the point 140. Of course, if R fails to take delivery it may itself lose 
its rights to some other third party: but whether R chooses to take that risk is R’s business. 
 Two further points reinforce this conclusion. For one thing, even where there is a 
requirement of delivery, it can be satisfied by a pretty meaningless rigmarole 141. 
Furthermore, the legal nature of delivery can give rise to distinctions of striking complexity 
142, which do no credit to anyone; suppressing the requirement of delivery at a stroke 
removes this sorry complication entirely from this area of the law of property. 
 
 
E. Must R take for value? 
 
The English law of nemo dat regards it as obvious beyond argument that a gratuitous 
transferee can never be protected as an innocent receiver. Indeed, even though two 
provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss.24 and 25, and also s.2 of the Factors Act 
1889, make no mention whatever of any need for R to give value, they are said on high 
authority to require it implicitly 143.  
 Strictly speaking, there is no necessity about this. There would be nothing 
incoherent were we to say that an owner entrusting goods to a possessor took the risk of 
unauthorised gifts as well as alienations for value 144: and indeed while in Germany the 
gratuitous transferee R essentially loses out to the original owner 145, some civil law 
systems do protect donees in the same way as other alienees 146.  Nevertheless, on 
balance it is submitted that the English view is the sounder on principle. With a gratuitous 
transferee who cannot point to any element of detrimental reliance, the equities seem 
                                            
140 This point is not new. It is forcefully made in L.van de Vliet (2001) 5 Edin. L.R. 361 (an excellent note by 
a civil lawyer on the difficult case of Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd v Wilkinson [2001] Q.B. 514). 
141 As in Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd v Wilkinson [2001] Q.B. 514 (a paper attornment). 
142 See e.g. The Saetta [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1334 and Angara Maritime Ltd v OceanConnect UK Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 619 (QB); [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 61. Nor is this a purely English phenomenon. The law in 
Germany is if anything even more convoluted, requiring two highly complex provisions of the BGB (§§ 
933-934) and a great deal of exegesis. For a summary, see F.Baur & R.Stürmer, Sachenrecht (18th ed), 
s.52, Nr 16-24. 
143 Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), paras.7-042, 7-064, 7-080. One strand in the argument is that in the words 
“sale, pledge or other disposition” in these sections, “disposition” is to be read eiusdem generis with sale 
or pledge, which both obviously do require value. See J.Peden, “Common Law Liens – An Anglo-
Australian Conflict” (1968) 6 Syd.L.Rev. 39, 49 and Roache v Australian Mercantile Land & Finance Co 
Ltd (No 2) (1966) 67 S.R. (N.S.W.) 54. 
144 Which may be encountered even in a commercial context: for example, goods given away as part of a 
marketing exercise.  
145 Admittedly in a roundabout way. On its face BGB, § 932 protects the ownership of all good faith 
receivers, gratuitous or otherwise. However, BGB § 816.2 says that gratuitous transferees are in these 
circumstances unjustly enriched and must return any benefit received, if necessary by reconveying the 
goods to the original owner. For a brief explanation of the relation between these provisions, see e.g. 
F.Peters, Der Entzug des Eigentums an beweglichen Sachen durch gutgläubigen Erwerb, p.78 and 
K.Tiedtke, Gutgläubiger Erwerb im bürgerlichen Recht, im Handels- und Wertpapierrecht sowie in der 
Zwangsvollstreckung, p.49. 
146 In particular France, where the Code Civil, Art.2276, refers merely to the recipient’s possession, and 
never mentions value, even inferentially. For a recent example of a case where a gratuitous transferee 
succeeded, see Civ 1, 17 février 2016, No 15-14121. The same is probably true in Switzerland: see 
Basler Kommentar zum Zivilgesetzbuch (5th ed), § 933, Rn 33 (stating that this is the prevailing, though 
controversial, opinion). 
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pretty strongly weighted in favour of the original owner 147.  
 On the other hand, the question of gratuitous transfer cannot necessarily be 
dismissed as simply as this. Although an innocent donee R ought not to become owner of 
the thing at the expense of O, it ought nevertheless to be protected in another way, namely 
by being insulated from liability beyond an obligation to return the goods. If at the time of 
any demand it has in good faith disposed of them (or lost them), or the goods have 
deteriorated, its liability should be limited accordingly. After all, one can hardly blame a 
possessor for alienating, or failing to take care of, goods it believes with good reason to be 
its own. The point matters in England, because if the common law position were left 
untouched, the law of conversion would in most cases 148 make R liable for the full value of 
the goods at the time it got them, even if when demanded back they had been devalued or 
lost; furthermore, if R had disposed of them, however innocently, it would be fixed with a 
liability for their value at the time of disposal 149. Any reform would thus have to provide for 
this (which, incidentally, is the solution of German law 150).  
 
 
F. Proprietary interests other than ownership 
 
Discussions of nemo dat and unlawful dispositions regularly assume that the problem is 
essentially one of deciding about ownership. In fact the issue is much more nuanced. O 
might be not an owner but a pledgee, lienholder, or mortgagee. Conversely P may have 
purported to grant R something less than ownership; not only a pledge (a possibility at 
least recognised in the Factors Act 1889 and in ss.24 and 25 of the 1979 Act), but, for 
example, a lease, a charge or a possessory lien. It is suggested that in any rational overall 
scheme, there must be a common rule for all proprietary interests, whether we are talking 
about the interest which O stands to lose, or that which R stands to gain.  
 As regards O’s interests it is not difficult to see why this must be. If an entrustment 
by O to P can justifiably cause O to be stripped of full ownership, a fortiori there can be no 
objection to its defeating some lesser interest in O. This point is accepted as obvious by 
many civil lawyers 151; moreover, there is evidence of at least a dim appreciation of it in 
England, where courts have on occasion strained to interpret some legislative reference to 
an ‘owner’ in a nemo dat context as referring equally to someone in the position of O but 
with a lesser interest 152.  
                                            
147 “The consequence of good faith acquisition for A – namely expropriation – is so severe that only good 
faith acquirers who would equally suffer a significant disadvantage by not allowing good faith acquisition 
deserve protection” – see C.von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), p 4156.  
148 Save perhaps estoppel. If O positively misleads P into believing that M is the owner of O's thing and as a 
result P accepts it as a gift from M, it is suggested that whatever the position as to ownership any claim 
by O in tort arising out of P's innocent receipt or disposal of the thing would fail on orthodox estoppel 
grounds. 
149 Under the rule in Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] A.C. 247 and BBMM Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd v Eda 
Holdings Ltd [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409. 
150 This is because the right of O to claw back the benefit obtained by an innocent donee under BGB § 816  
is based on R’s unjust enrichment, to which R has a defence of good faith disenrichment. See the 
articles referred to at Note 136 above. 
151 See, for example, German law as described at Note 137 above, making it clear that a good faith receiver 
takes free of all interests that would otherwise inhere in entrusters. 
152 See Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association [1938] 2 K.B. 147 (pledgee 
is “owner” within Factors Act, s.2, so that when goods returned to dealer-pledgor under trust receipt, 
latter could sell unencumbered); see too Beverley Acceptances Ltd v Oakley [1982] R.T.R. 417 (same 
assumption), and compare National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Jones 
[1990] 1 A.C. 24 (“owner” under s.25 of the Sale of Goods Act embraces good faith possessor of stolen 
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 Moreover, as a matter of principle a similar a fortiori argument ought to apply to R. If 
we are happy in an entrustment case to grant R absolute ownership and thus to eclipse 
O’s interest entirely, there is no good reason not to do the same where the transaction 
between P and R creates some lesser interest like a lease or a pledge, which merely 
burdens O’s right with some lesser interest of R’s. This is indeed partly recognised in many 
European jurisdictions by the extension of protection ad hoc to such interests, generously 
in Germany 153 though less so in France 154. It is also grudgingly admitted in England, in 
that a few of the exceptions to nemo dat protect pledgees and analogous receivers.   
 All this is, of course, subject to a major constraint: we are talking only of proprietary 
interests, as against mere personal claims vested in R 155. But what ought to count as a 
proprietary interest? In the present English context, unless pre-empted by statute 156 R’s 
protection seems to embrace any traditional legal or equitable interest, including that of an  
equitable chargee or lienholder 157. But what about possessory interests? Imagine R takes 
a lease of goods, or buys them subject to reservation of title: does this yield a mere 
contractual right against P, or a property interest? English lawyers instinctively say the 
former, on the basis that a lessee is never, and a buyer under a mere conditional 
agreement to sell not yet, an owner 158. But, at least where R is in possession, this seems 
perverse. Possession carries within it its own (proprietary) rights. Thus title to sue for 
conversion inheres in a lessee 159, or a purchaser in possession subject to reservation of 
title 160; both too, it seems, can also cite their possession to resist claims to surrender of 
the goods , whether by the contractual counterparty 161 or anyone else 162. If so, it is 
suggested that such rights should be regarded as possessing sufficiently proprietary 
                                                                                                                                                 
car). 
153 Where protection is extended it to good faith pledgees (BGB, § 1244) and to a few privileged lienholders, 
such as carriers and commission agents (see HGB,  § 366.3). Switzerland does much the same: ZGB, § 
714.2 (ownership) is extended to cover usufruct (§ 746.2), pledge (§ 884) and lien (§ 895).  
154 French jurists regard the wording of Code Civil, Art.2276 as limited to ownership, insisting accordingly 
that only possession animo domini in R will do. But case-law has grudgingly allowed at least some 
créanciers gagistes (i.e. holders of liens and pledges) to benefit as well. See generally F.Terré & P.Simler, 
Les Biens (8th ed), s.433; P.Malaurie & L.Aynès, Les Biens (6th ed), s.577. 
155 See, in the context of s.24 of the 1979 Act (and by extension also s.25(1) and s.2 of the Factors Act 
1889), Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Co Ltd  [1972] 1 Q.B. 210, 220 (Megaw LJ: 
"’Disposition’ must involve some transfer of an interest in property”);  also Ramsey J in P4 Ltd v Unite 
Integrated Solutions PLC [2006] EWHC 2640 (TCC) at [115] (need for “transfer of an interest, legal or 
equitable”), and in the parallel context of title by estoppel, Shaw v Met. Police Commissioner  [1987] 1 
W.L.R. 1332. 
156 As with sellers and buyer in possession, and also mercantile agents. Sections 24 and 25 of the sale of 
Goods Act and s.2 of the Factors Act only protect recipients under a “sale, pledge or other disposition”. 
157 Compare Attenborough v London & St. Katharine's Dock Co (1878) 3 C.P.D. 450 (holder of voidable title 
can create equitable pledge good against original owner). 
158 See Re Highway Foods International Ltd [1995] B.C.C. 271 (buyer under reservation of title which has 
taken delivery but not paid cannot be protected under Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.25) and Shaw v Met. 
Police Commissioner [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1332 (estoppel cannot protect interest of would-be buyer in 
possession to whom property has not yet passed).  
159 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st ed), Para.17-64. 
160 See Indian Herbs (UK) Ltd v Hadley & Ottoway Ltd, unrep., CA, January 21, 1999 
161 See On Demand Information Plc (in Administrative Receivership) v Michael Gerson (Finance) Plc [2001] 
1 W.L.R. 155, 171 (Robert Walker L.J.: “Contractual rights which entitle the hirer to indefinite possession 
of chattels so long as the hire payments are duly made, and which qualify and limit the owner’s general 
property in the chattels, cannot aptly be described as purely contractual rights.”); also Hendy Lennox 
(Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485, 491, 495 (Staughton J).  
162 See generally On Demand Information Plc (in Administrative Receivership) v Michael Gerson (Finance) 
Plc [2001] 1 W.L.R. 155, 171, above; G.Watt, “The proprietary effect of a chattel lease” [2003] Conv. 61. 
But not all agree: see e.g. W.Swadling, “The Proprietary Effect of a Hire of Goods” in N.Palmer & 
E.McKendrick, Interests in Goods (2nd ed), ch 20.  
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characteristics to be brought within the protection of any legislation so as to be exercisable 
against O in addition 163. 
 
 
G. Protection for other parties 
 
The main thrust of this article concerns the protection of R and the proprietary interest 
transferred to it. But there is one case where it needs to go further and provide some sort 
of a shield for third parties. Imagine that P, entrusted by O with goods, dishonestly sells 
them to an innocent buyer R using the services of X, a dealing agent or auctioneer; and 
assume further that X acts without fault. The problem is that even if R is protected, without 
more the intermediary X, who claims no proprietary interest, is not 164. Instead X would 
face strict liability to O in the tort of conversion 165, at least in so far it exercised any 
physical control over the goods in the course of arranging the sale 166. This is perverse: in 
so far as a receiver R is protected from liability to O, the same must go a fortiori for those 
whose part in the transaction is merely ancillary. More formally, therefore, it is suggested 
that in any entrustment scheme it would need to be provided that those acting innocently 
on the instructions of either P or R in a transaction where R's interest would be protected 
should themselves receive a statutory shield against liability in conversion. 
 
 
H. The effect of an entrusting rule on existing statutory exceptions 
 
We suggest below that a general entrusting rule should supplement, and not replace, the 
existing protections available to a good faith purchaser (see “The place of an entrustment 
regime in the scheme of things”). However, it is suggested that this should be subject to 
one qualification concerning the current s.2 of the Factors Act 1889 and ss.24 and 25 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 167. As was pointed out above, these provisions contain more 
than their fair share of anomaly, narrow distinctions and obscure draftsmanship. 
Furthermore, virtually all the situations they deal with would in any case be covered – and 
covered in a more extensive and logical way – by the scheme proposed here. There 
seems no reason to complicate matters by keeping these antique and partial provisions, 
and they should go. 
 One might say the same about s.23 of the 1979 Act, dealing with voidable title. 
Theoretically no harm would be done by getting rid of it, since all it does is partially re-
enact the common law position for one particular special case 168, and most instances will 
be covered by the new scheme anyway. On the other hand, in one matter it goes further 
                                            
163 A point at least partly recognised in the UCC: see UCC, Art.2A-304, giving a good-faith lessee of goods 
from a non-owner a valid interest parallel to that of a good-faith buyer.  
164 Save in one, admittedly obscure, case: if a farmer fraudulently sells goods subject to an agricultural 
charge, the innocent auctioneer is protected under s.6(3) of the Agricultural Credits Act 1928. 
165 Consolidated Co v Curtis & Son [1892] 1 Q.B. 495; Willis (RH) & Son v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 1 
W.L.R. 438. The suggestion in the old case of Shenstone & Co v Hilton [1894] 2 Q.B. 452 that X might be 
protected if R was a buyer in possession seems highly doubtful (cf Roache v Australian Mercantile  Land 
& Finance Co Ltd (No 2) (1966) 67 S.R.(N.S.W.) 54 and Suttons Motors (Temora) Pty Ltd v Hollywood 
Motors Pty Ltd [1971] V.R. 684). 
166 It seems a mere broker who does nothing but shuffle paper escapes liability: National Mercantile Bank v 
Rymill (1881) 44 L.T. 767 and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st ed), Para.17-17. But the boundary of this 
protection is alarmingly unclear, and the need for protection remains. 
167 And of course their virtual doppelgangers in ss.8-9 of the Factors Act 1889. 
168 Partially, because it only applies to sales by P and not to the creation of other interests in R. 
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than any entrustment rule: it does not require P to be in possession of the goods at all 169. 
Thus if O sells to P under a voidable contract but remains in possession, and P then sells 
on to R, R’s interests are protected. This result seems entirely unbjectionable, and since 
there is no reason to throw it into doubt we might as well preserve s.23 as a harmless 





For simplicity’s sake, we have argued the case for a general entrusting rule on a largely 
commercial basis. It must be recognised that with goods not traded or used commercially, 
there may be a case for requiring different treatment. There is something to be said, for 
example, for allowing non-commercial purchasers of consumer goods to succeed in the 
absence of actual knowledge that the disposition to them is unauthorised (as is presently 
the case with s.27 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 170). There might even be an argument in 
favour of an analogous protection for owners of such goods, preventing any buyer acting 
in the course of a business from invoking the entrustment rule as against them 171. And 
there may be other examples of goods that exceptionally ought to be protected. An 
example might be artefacts on loan for display, on the basis that the social interest in 
preserving their public availability requires some of the normal proprietary rules to be 
qualified 172.  
 
 
J. The place of an entrustment regime in the scheme of things 
 
As mentioned above, what is being suggested here is not a universal but a fall-back 
principle. No rule can accommodate all participants or events; nor for that matter should it 
try to, especially when it comes to detailed regimes based on statutory registers of security 
interests, or – even more importantly – systems based on international conventions. 
Indeed, this residuary feature has been a feature of civil law systems that recognise an 
entrustment principle, which have never had much difficulty with carving out exceptions to 
accommodate specific regimes 173. So too any replacement English system would take 
effect as a default rule, subject to exceptions. 
 What actual or possible exceptions are we talking about? 
 First, there are principles relevant to unauthorised dispositions arising out of the 
general law (as opposed to legislation): most obviously the rule protecting the good faith 
purchaser of goods subject to any equitable interest, and the  principles of agency and the 
rules of estoppel. They are well-established, and it would be a recipe for confusion to try to 
cut them back; instead it should be accepted that, while they will be partly overlaid by any 
entrusting rule, they may well continue to have a field of application outside it.  
                                            
169 A point made in Benjamin on Sale (9th ed), para.7-008. 
170 See s.29(3) (though this also protects some non-consumer purchases). The Secured Transactions Law 
Reform Project’s STR General Policy Paper (April 2016), Para.3-26, discusses whether consumers may 
need more generalised protection in. 
171 Compare  M. Mautner, “’The Eternal Triangles of the Law’: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts 
Involving Remote Parties” (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 95, 129. 
172 Compare the limited immunity against seizure by creditors of art lent internationally for display in 
museums and galleries: see Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, Part 6. 
173 A straightforward example: the 2008 French regime for creation and registration of charges (gages) over 
moveable property inserted by Ordonnance 2006-346, 23.03.2006 as Arts.2333 - 2350 of the Civil Code. 
Art.2337 states laconically in that, once a charge is registered, Art.2276 (the general provision giving title 
to a good faith purchaser) does not apply. 
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 Secondly, specific statutory schemes providing for the adjustment of existing 
ownership or security rights. Examples of these are the rules relating to securities over 
chattels registrable under Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006, those covering interests in 
aircraft under the Cape Town Convention 174, and more recondite matters such as the 
Agricultural Credits Act 1928 175. These schemes are concerned with security interests of 
one sort or another, such as the rues on disposals by bankrupts 176, or the rules of Part II 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 on transfer of title to registered ships 177. Moreover, this 
list may well grow, if (for example)  it is thought desirable to add a workable scheme of 
secured lending to replace the Bills of Sale Acts 178, to make title retention agreements or 
finance leases registrable securities 179, to replace the present privileged status of 
possessory security in commercial contexts with a requirement of registration 180, or for 






The import of this paper can be briefly summarised. It is difficult to deny that the current 
position as to nemo dat in England is an arbitrary and unpredictable mess. No-one, given 
a clean sheet of paper and a brief to design a new system, would come up with the one we 
have. It follows that we need a substantial recasting, with a view to producing a default rule 
on unauthorised dispositions of chattels that is easy to understand, rational and logical. 
Such a rule should follow three principles 
 
(1) The background rule should be one of entrustment, under which a proprietor putting or 
leaving another in possession of goods prima facie takes the risk of subsequent 
misdealing. 
 
(2) The principle should be universal and not limited to ownership. It should be capable, 
where it applies, of defeating or protecting any proprietary interest. 
 
(3) However, a general principle of this kind should emphatically be only a prima facie rule. 
It should be open to exceptions where there is good reason to admit them, for example 
where it is necessary to have a specific scheme covering particular types of security 
interest, or where particular actors are regarded as in need of special protection. What is 
                                            
174 See the International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town Convention) Regulations 2015, SI 2015 
No 912. For a neat account of its relation with national law, see R.Goode, “Private commercial law 
conventions and public and private international law: the radical approach of the Cape Town Convention 
2001 and its Protocols” (2016) 65 I.C.L.Q. 523. 
175 Which, having set up a registration scheme, contains a general good faith purchaser protection in s.6(3)). 
176 Insolvency Act 1986, Part IX, Chapter II. This again contain a general good faith purchaser provision: see 
s.284(4)(a). 
177 In particular, s.16 and Sch.1. 
178 That is, the Bills of Sale Act 1878 and the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. See the Law 
Commission’s recommendation to that effect: Law Com Report No 369. 
179 As advocated by the Law Commission in the past (Consultation Paper on Registration of Security 
Interests: Company Charges and Property other than Land, Law Com CP No 164 (2002), Para 7.24), 
and discussed more recently by the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project: see STR General Policy 
Paper (April 2016), Paras.3-21 – 3.25. 
180 As tentatively suggested by the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project: see Working Group A, Case 
for reform paper series, Methods of perfection. 
181 As proposed by the Law Commission in 2005 (see Law Com No 296 Company Security Interests), and 
discussed on a continuing basis under the aegis of the Secured Transactions Law Reform Project. 
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necessary is a simple and workable underlying scheme that meshes as sweetly as 
possible with exceptions of this kind. 
 
 
(c) Andrew Tettenborn 2017 
 
 
